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Abstract 
What should the scope of nuclear critique within international studies be? This 
article addresses that question by making two interrelated arguments. First that 
political programmes of international nuclear order are crucially underpinned by 
what is termed here as ‘nutopianism’: a mode of understanding nuclear power that 
is imbued with a spirit of technological optimism in relation to ‘peaceful’ nuclear 
power, but simultaneously qualified by an awareness of the destructive uses and 
catastrophic potentialities of nuclear weapons. Second, that such nutopianism is in 
turn predicated on the ‘saving power’ of ‘the atom’: the assumption that nuclear 
power has redeeming features crucial to human progress and economic prosperity, 
the development of which should be facilitated within the structures of international 
order. The article makes the case that critical thought within international studies 
focuses on nuclear weapons with international order, but has tended to remain 
largely silent on the issue of ‘civil’ nuclear power beyond nuclear weapons and the 
complex imbrications between the two. On that basis the article considers whether a 
more holistic and expansive form of nuclear critique is both possible and necessary. 
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Introduction 
 
I'm a scientist and an inventor, and it is absurd to reject nuclear energy […] It 
all comes from the religious side. They feel guilty about dropping atom bombs 
on people. Here was this extraordinary gift given to humans – a safe, cheap 
source of power – and it gets horribly abused right at the start. We're still 
playing out the guilt [sic] feelings about it. But it's sad because we in Britain 
could now be having cheap energy if we'd gone on building [nuclear power 
stations].  
- James Lovelock (2015)1 
 
 
We do better to overcome our denial and dissociation and to instead 
acknowledge that radiation effects are one and the same no matter what their 
source, that the combination of nature and human fallibility makes no 
technology completely safe, and the technology most dangerous to us can 
hardly be relied upon to provide something ‘clean’ or pure, or to otherwise 
redeem us.  
- Robert Jay Lifton (2011).2 
 
 
The quotation above from James Lovelock – renowned as the originator of ‘Gaia 
Theory’3  – stands as a pertinent reminder that technological optimism still has a 
presence in contemporary debates on nuclear power. Elements of such optimism can 
also still routinely be found in the promotion of new ‘generations’ of nuclear power 
stations as a means (or key component of the means) to combat global climate 
change; in arguments for ‘small modular reactors’ as the future of household 
electrical provision;4 and in continuing hopes for fusion technologies as the power 
source of the future.5 Lovelock’s characterization, however, suggests that the history 
of and prospects for nuclear power looks forever damned by the dropping of the 
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki consequent ensuing ‘guilt’. The latter 
‘feelings’, he asserts, lead to continuing misguided rejection of nuclear power (‘this 
extraordinary gift to humans’), with the UK is cited as a particular example of how 
such ‘religiosity’ has impeded the development of ‘a safe, cheap source of power’.6 
By way of contrast, the characterization expressed by Robert Jay Lifton, suggests a 
diametrically opposed caution towards the assumed ‘redeeming’ aspects of nuclear 
                                                        
1 James Lovelock, as quoted in Moss, Stephen Moss (2014) ‘James Lovelock: “Instead of robot taking 
over the world, what if we join with them”?’, The Guardian, 30 March 2014, np. Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/30/james-lovelock-robots-taking-over-world. Last 
accessed May 6, 2015. 
2 Robert Jay Lifton, ‘Fukushima and Hiroshima’, The New York Times, 15 April 2011, np. Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/16/opinion/16iht-edlifton16.html?_r=1&. Last accessed May 6, 
2015. 
3 Or ‘Gaia Theory’ – originally articulated in James Lovelock, Gaia:  New Look at Life on Earth 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
4 World Nuclear Association, ‘Small Nuclear Power Reactors’, 30 April 2015. Available at 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Power-Reactors/Small-Nuclear-Power-
Reactors/. Last accessed May 6, 2015. 
5 See CCFE (Culham Centre for Fusion Energy). Available at http://www.ccfe.ac.uk/. Last accessed 
May 6, 2015. 
6 As quoted in Moss, ‘James Lovelock’, np. 
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power, and a refusal to make Lovelock’s strict distinction between nuclear 
technologies as weapons of destruction and providers of energy.  
 
Despite the opposition of their views, both Lovelock and Lifton invoke notions of 
‘guilt’ and ‘redemption’. The argument made below is that this is not only a thematic 
engaged by such broader reflections on the nature of the ‘nuclear age’, but also 
crucially underpins attempts to construct and legitimate international nuclear order.7 
To characterize this kind of thinking the concept of ‘nutopia’ is here employed as a 
contraction of the terms ‘nuclear’ and ‘utopia’, a portmanteau word used as shorthand 
to denote a form of technological optimism in which nuclear power and technologies 
are identified as key to a more progressive human future. Hopes articulated in the 
1950s that the advent of nuclear power would lead to the creation of utopian ‘white 
cities’ powered by ‘electrical energy too cheap too meter’ - to accompany 
‘…expectations that our children will know of great periodic regional famines in the 
world only as matters of history, will travel effortlessly over the seas and under them 
with a minimum of danger and with great speeds, and will experience a lifespan far 
longer than ours, as disease yields and man comes to understand what causes him to 
age’8 - are, Spencer Weart argues, a key part of the ‘imagery’ of the nuclear age.9 
Insofar as the promotion of nuclear power is imbued and bound up with different 
national variants of technological utopianism and futuristic visions10, though, it might 
now be argued that such utopianism is now routinely taken with a large dose of 
ingrained cynicism. The regular near-meltdowns of Springfield’s nuclear power 
station in the animated television comedy The Simpsons is but one iteration of an 
embedded scepticism about nuclear power in a popular cultural form that reaches 
millions of viewers worldwide and in eight languages other than English. What might 
                                                        
7 By way of clarification and qualification, the title of this article is a wordplay on Michael Löwy’s 
Redemption and Utopia: Jewish Libertarian Thought in Central Europe – A study in elective affinity 
(London: The Athlone Press, 1992). As the difference in the subtitles suggests, the article has an 
otherwise thin relation to Löwy’s thesis that thinkers as diverse as Martin Buber, Franz Kafka, Georg 
Lukács and Walter Benjamin were united by a shared affinity for and concern with the Kabbalistic idea 
of Tikkoun (‘redemption’). Equally, the use of the term ‘nutopia’ here does not substantively draw on 
or engage with John Lennon and Yoko Ono’s ‘declaration’, on April 1st 1973, of ‘a conceptual country’ 
of the same name in the midst of Lennon’s struggle to gain permanent resident status in the United 
States - See ‘John Lennon & Yoko Ono – Nutopia Announcement’, 1 April 1973. Available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5xOzjDfmPCk. Last accessed March 6, 2015. 
8 The remarks are attributed to Lewis Strauss, then as Head of the US Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC), speaking in September 1954. Recent retrospectives on Strauss’s remarks (reportedly made in a 
speech to the US National Association of Science Writers on September 16th, and as recorded and 
popularized by the New York Times in an article published the following day) contend that Strauss 
made no explicit reference to nuclear power as the (sole) source of ‘electricity too cheap to meter’ 
(although his status within the AEC might reasonably suggest that assumption as implicit). See 
media.cns, ‘Too Cheap to Meter?’, 20 February 2009. Available at http://media.cns-
snc.ca/media/toocheap/toocheap.html. Last accessed May 6, 2015.  
9 Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1988) pp.5-7. An updated version, but broadly consistent with the arguments of the initial publication, 
is Spencer R. Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
10 See, amongst others: Weart, Nuclear Fear and The Rise of Nuclear Fear; Paul Josephson, 
‘Technological Utopianism in the Twenty-First Century:  Russia’s Nuclear Future’, History and 
Technology 19, no.3 (2003): 277-292; Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and 
National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009); M.V. Ramana, The Power of 
Promise: Examining Nuclear Energy in India (New Delhi: Viking, 2012). 
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be regarded as the ‘golden age’ of nuclear utopianism in the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s 
gave way to persistent concerns over the safety and efficacy of nuclear power, 
especially in the wake of events such as Three Mile Island in 1979, Chernobyl in 
1986, and Fukushima Daiichi in 2011. More generally, the continuing legacies of 
attempted shifts to a ‘plutonium economy’11, the technical challenges of developing 
technologies such as ‘Fast Breeder Reactors’, issues associated with the disposal and 
storage radioactive waste, and the financial costs of developing nuclear power 
facilities have all arguably combined to create significant wariness towards visions of 
nuclear utopias.  Hence nuclear utopianism might be regarded, as Sheldon Ungar puts 
it, as a kind of ‘tarnished faith’.12  
 
And yet, as the article seeks to illustrate, programmes for the regulation of the 
international nuclear order continue to be centrally predicated on the promised 
benefits and redeeming features of nuclear power. The remains a crucial aspect of the 
animating rationales and purposes of, to name two of the most prominent examples, 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). The article consequently makes the interrelated contentions: that 
international proposals to control, reduce and end horrific potential of nuclear 
weapons tend to be predominantly and crucially predicated on assumed redeeming 
features of nuclear power as an embedded form of ‘common sense’; and that critical 
approaches within international studies end up leaving the ‘nutopianism’ 
underpinning such proposals largely unquestioned.  
 
To date, as is argued in detail in the section below, the dominant object of critique 
within international studies has been nuclear weapons. The problem of ‘nuclearism’ 
as originally identified in the seminal (1982) critique of the international nuclear order 
by Robert Jay Lifton and Richard Falk13 was specifically delimited precisely as a 
weapons problem, and critical work in international studies has generally tended to 
reproduce that assumption. This article does not suggest that this is unimportant or 
seek to undermine the significance work in that vein. Rather it makes the case that a 
significant proportion of critical international thought assumes and reproduces a 
straightforward distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘military’ nuclear power as a given, 
with a concurrent emphasis on nuclear weapons as the problem of international 
nuclear order. In doing so, such critiques leave unexamined the common suturing of 
‘constructive’ and ‘destructive’ applications of nuclear power within programmes of 
international nuclear order.14 Yet as William Walker puts it, the ‘central question of 
the nuclear age’ has, precisely: 
 
                                                        
11 See, relatedly, Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet and 
American Plutonium Disasters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
12 As cited in Robert Jay Lifton ‘Illusions of the Second Nuclear Age’, World Policy Journal 18, no.1 
(2001): 25-30, p.27. 
13 Robert Jay Lifton and Richard Falk, Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case 
Against Nuclearism (New York: Basic Books, 1982). 
14 By way of contrast, more ‘mainstream’ (in the sense of not explicitly self-identifying as adopting a 
critical approach) analyses have foregrounded the ‘dual use’ nature of nuclear power and the 
development of ‘domestic’ nuclear energy programmes as a central feature and problem of 
international order; see, most prominently, Matthew Fuhrmann, Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for 
Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). 
5 
 
 
[…] been how to draw states into [a] logic representing a pragmatic middle way – a logic of 
restraint. This has entailed accepting the presence of nuclear weapons in the world “for the time 
being” whilst placing limits on their possession and usage, without unduly impeding either 
deterrence or the diffusion of nuclear materials and technologies for civil purposes. Installing 
and embedding this logic and rendering it tolerable have lain at the heart of the problem and 
project of nuclear order.15 
 
Indeed the lasting centrality of this logic to practical programmes for the creation of 
international nuclear order becomes all the more worthy of critical examination in the 
midst of the increased scepticism towards nuclear utopianism referred to above.  
 
To begin such an examination, the article employs an illustrative method that 
highlights multiple episodic iterations and reiterations of such ‘nutopianism’ as a form 
of common sense argumentation over time. Here ‘common sense’ is used in the 
Gramscian conception of a form of understanding that has become embedded within 
political discourse, a ‘syncretic historical residue […] an amalgam of historically 
effective ideologies, scientific doctrines and social mythologies’16 that has become 
‘common’.17 Specifically, in the sections on ‘Nutopianism and International Order’ 
and ‘Making the world safe for the development of nuclear power?’ the focus of the 
article is on exemplifying common sense articulations of the redeeming features of 
nuclear power. Once this interrelation of arguments for ‘constructive’ uses of nuclear 
technologies and against ‘destructive’ destructive applications is recognised, a 
legitimate question can be raised as to whether the scope of nuclear critique within 
international studies should be expanded in a more holistic and encompassing sense to 
include critique of nutopianism, as is discussed in the section ‘Nuclearism 
reconsidered’. It may be that a more discrete form of nuclear weapons critique may be 
worth persevering with. But at the very least it would be worth reflecting on the 
grounds for doing so, and the latter stages of the article outlines potential reasons for 
reconsidering the scope of nuclear critique in a more expansive fashion.  
 
The scope of nuclear critique: ‘Nuclearism’ and its discontents 
 
In a review of ‘Critical Thinking about Nuclear Weapons’, Benoît Pelopidas 
recommends that ‘critical thinkers’ should ‘challenge the accepted causal 
relationships between phenomena, investigate previously neglected or “unauthorized 
problems” […] Similarly, examining issues that the most critical experts (willing to 
be recognized as such) do not challenge sheds light on what binds the community 
together in descriptive and prescriptive terms’.18 So what is it that such ‘critical 
experts’ might challenge and not challenge? In large part the scope of nuclear critique 
                                                        
15 William Walker, A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order (Oxon: Routledge, 
2012) p.5, emphasis in original. The term ‘international nuclear order’ is used in this article as my own 
shorthand for the characterisation of the ‘project of nuclear order’ that Walker offers here. 
16 Mark Rupert, ‘Globalising Common Sense: a Marxian-Gramscian (re-)Vision of the Politics of 
Governance/Resistance’, Review of International Studies 29, December (2003): 181-98, p.185. 
17 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1973) 
pp.328-331. For a more detailed discussion of the approach adopted here, see Columba Peoples, 
Justifying Ballistic Missile Defence: Technology, Security and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), pp.41-44. 
18 Benoît Pelopidas, ‘Critical Thinking about Nuclear Weapons’, Non-Proliferation Review, 17, no.1 
(2010): 189-196, p.190. 
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within international studies is already identified in Pelopidas’ title, with added 
emphasis, of ‘Critical Thinking about Nuclear Weapons’. The most prominent 
exemplar in this respect is Robert Jay Lifton and Richard Falk’s identification of 
‘nuclearism’ as ‘psychological, political and military dependence on nuclear weapons, 
[and] the embrace of weapons as a solution to a wide variety of human dilemmas, 
most ironically that of “security”’.19  For Lifton in particular20 the invention and use 
of nuclear weapons – and the attendant horrors of the aftermath of the nuclear 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki21 – requires a particular kind of psychological 
structure that both suppresses knowledge of the effects of use of these weapons and, 
simultaneously, maintains the ‘reasonable’ assumption that the existence and 
continued possession of such weapons by states creates security. Yet insofar as, for 
Lifton, ‘…security means feeling safe, experiencing one’s environment as reliable 
and, generally speaking, life enhancing’, the ‘central existential fact of the nuclear age 
is vulnerability’.22  The ‘nuclear age’ has been made possible by a form of 
technological revolution, but is only sustainable if it is accompanied by a particular 
mode of acceptance of and dependence on nuclear weapons as assumed instruments 
of security provision.  
 
Lifton of course argues that the ‘central existential fact’ of nuclear vulnerability 
inherently undermines the ‘rationality’ of security predicated on nuclear weapons, and 
precisely creates a countervailing ‘impulse’ to ‘[reclaim] the opposite and infinitely 
more comfortable state of security’.23 Ken Booth subsequently identified a need to 
move away from a ‘negative synergy’ of ‘nuclearism and security’ – where security is 
assumed to be dependent on nuclear weapons – to a ‘positive synergy’ of ‘human 
rights and security’. The latter would necessarily encompass the elimination of 
nuclear weapons based on the logic, as concisely articulated in Booth’s terms, of 
‘…zero [nuclear weapons] as the only rational goal’.24 Similarly, although drawing 
less explicitly on the concept of nuclearism, there are arguably strong parallels 
between the feminist critique of nuclear weapons espoused by Carol Cohn and Sara 
Ruddick25 and Lifton’s emphasis on the bodily effects of nuclear weapons in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In both the corporeal effects of nuclear weapons are placed 
                                                        
19 Lifton and Falk, Indefensible Weapons, p.ix.  
20 Lifton and Falk’s Indefensible Weapons contains a co-authored preface and conclusion, but is 
subdivided into Section I (‘Imagining the Real’) authored by Lifton and Section II (‘The Political 
Anatomy of Nuclearism’) by Falk, hence my characterisation of Lifton’s arguments as discrete, when 
citing Section I of the text. 
21 See also, in particular, Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell, Hiroshima in America: A Half Century 
of Denial (New York: Avon Books, 1995) and Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Markusen, The Genocidal 
Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat (New York: Basic Books, 1990). 
22 Lifton in Indefensible Weapons, p.23. Emphasis in original. 
23 Lifton in Lifton and Falk, Indefensible Weapons, p.23. 
24 Ken Booth ‘Nuclearism, human rights, and constructions of security (part 1)’, International Journal 
of Human Rights 3, no. 2 (1999): 1-24, p.2; p.14. Cf. Anthony Burke, ‘Nuclear Reason: At the Limits 
of Strategy’, International Relations 23, no.4 (2009): 506-529. 
25 Carol Cohn, ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals’, Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society 12, no.4 (1987):687-718; Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick, ‘A Feminist 
Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Consortium on Gender, Security and Human 
Rights, 2003. Available at 
http://cgshr.resonetrics.com/sites/default/files/a_feminist_ethical_perspective_on_weapons_of_mass_d
estruction_0.pdf. Last accessed May 6 2015. 
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at the forefront in order illustrate and cut through the ‘ways that the abstraction and 
euphemism of nuclear discourse protect nuclear planners and politicians from the 
grisly realities behind their words’26, and how, especially when set in the context of 
the suffering endured by Hiroshima victims and survivors the euphemisms of 
‘nukespeak’ have an ‘anesthetizing quality’ and ‘provide a way of talking about 
nuclear weapons without really talking about them’.27  
 
It might be argued that, ostensibly at least, such critiques of nuclearism within 
international studies are particularly apposite to an apparent ‘renaissance in [nuclear] 
disarmament politics’ within the past decade.28 The policy advocacy work of the so-
called ‘four horsemen’ - former US Secretary of State George P. Shultz, former 
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, former Secretary of State Henry A. 
Kissinger and former Senator Sam Nunn (see the ongoing ‘Nuclear Security 
Project’29, established in 2007) – is often credited with having generated a ‘sustained 
scholarly debate over the desirability and feasibility of nuclear abolition’.30 Variations 
of the ‘zero [nuclear weapons] as the only rational goal’ logic appeared within 
President Obama’s ‘Prague Speech’31 (in terms of its rhetoric at least), and the wider 
campaign and debates on ‘Getting to Zero Nuclear Weapons’.32 Initiatives such as the 
‘Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons’ might also be said to crucially 
incorporate a focus on the corporeal effects and physical environmental and 
ecological impacts of nuclear weapons as an intended spur towards global nuclear 
disarmament. One of the foremost historians of nuclear deterrence could confidently 
assert by 2011 that ‘The idea that nuclear weapons can and should be completely 
eliminated has achieved a degree of interest and credibility that it has not enjoyed 
since the first decade of the nuclear age, not least because of some high profile 
supporters’.33 Thus attention to and further development of critical perspectives on 
nuclear weapons within international studies is arguably particularly relevant and 
timely. Catherine M. Kelleher and Scott L. Warren argued in the wake of Obama’s 
Prague speech that ‘A critical debate on nuclear weapons is once again in the 
limelight’ and that ‘Under the Obama policy, zero nuclear weapons is for the first 
time in US history, an operational, tangible US policy goal and thus a measuring stick 
                                                        
26 Cohn and Ruddick, ‘A Feminist Ethical Perspective’, p.12. 
27 Lifton in Indefensible Weapons, pp.38-47; p.106-107, emphasis in original.  
28 Anne Harrington de Santana, ‘The Strategy of Non-proliferation: Maintaining the Credibility of an 
Incredible Pledge to Disarm’, Millennium 40, no.1 (2011): 3-19, p.6. 
29 Nuclear Security Project, ‘About NSP’, no date. Available at 
http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org/about/about-nsp. Last accessed May 6 2015.  
30 Martin Senn and Christoph Elhardt, ‘Bourdieu and the bomb: power, language and the doxic battle 
over the value of nuclear weapons’, European Journal of International Relations 20, no.2 (2014): 316-
340, p.317. 
31 ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Czech Republic’, 5 April, 2009. Available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-
Delivered. Last accessed May 6 2015. 
32 See ‘Global Zero: A world without nuclear weapons’, no date. Available as 
http://www.globalzero.org/. Last accessed May 6 2015. 
33 Lawrence D. Freedman, ‘[Review of Catherine M. Kelleher and Judith Reppy (eds.)] Getting to 
Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament’, in Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011, np. Available 
at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68155/catherine-kelleherjudith-reppy/getting-to-zero-the-
path-to-nuclear-disarmament. Last accessed May 6 2015. 
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against which to judge a host of shorter-range, less ambitious initiatives and 
arguments’.34  
 
Doubtless critical thinking in its various forms within international studies can has a 
significant contribution to make in evaluating such initiatives, and the extent to 
which, for example, Obama’s Prague vision is manifested in substantive efforts by the 
US (and other states) towards nuclear disarmament and renunciation of nuclear 
weapons (or not – Kelleher and Warren’s ‘measuring stick’). But critical thinking in 
international studies might consider whether focusing predominantly (if not at times 
exclusively) on nuclear weapons is sufficient. When Ken Booth in his critique of 
nuclearism uses the terms ‘pro-’ and ‘anti-nuclear’, or ‘anti-nuclear opinion’35, he has 
in mind, strictly speaking, ‘pro-‘and ‘anti-nuclear’ weapons. That may seem like 
sheer pedantry; but the limitation of the critique of nuclearism to a focus on weapons, 
although consistent with Lifton and Falk’s original use of the term, arguably enacts a 
hard distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘military’ nuclear power. This tendency to frame 
nuclear weapons as the central marker and problem of the ‘nuclear age’ remains 
characteristic also of more recent critical interventions within international studies. 
Marianne Hanson, for example, calls for ‘…an informed critical security studies 
project that explicitly tackles the question of nuclear weapons at a global level’.36 And 
when Rens van Munster and Casper Sylvest turn to an earlier tradition of ‘nuclear 
realism’ in the 1950s as an attempt to reinvigorate contemporary critical thinking and 
‘reclaim nuclear politics for a wider public’, both their identification of that tradition 
and the contemporary ‘nuclear politics’ they seek to relate it to are, fundamentally, 
focused on a concern with nuclear weapons.37  
 
Nutopianism and International Order 
 
While there is much to commend in this scholarship, it could be argued that such 
critiques of nuclearism, in their assumption of the ‘nuclear age’ as the ‘nuclear 
weapons age’, unintentionally reproduce the fetishisation of nuclear weapons that 
they set out to critique - to the virtual exclusion of other potential dimensions of 
nuclear politics, risk and insecurity.38 The original formulation of the concept of 
‘nuclearism’ locates nuclear weapons ‘at the heart of our fear’.39 The concept of 
                                                        
34 Catherine M. Kelleher and Scott L. Warren (2009) ‘Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear 
Weapons’, Arms Control Today October 2009, np. Available at 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher. Last accessed May 6 2015. 
35 Booth ‘Nuclearism, human rights, and constructions of security (part 1)’, p.3. 
36 Marianne Hanson, ‘Nuclear Weapons in the Asia-Pacific’ in Anthony Burke and Matt McDonald 
(eds.) Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007) pp.183-
196, p.197; cf. Marianne Hanson, ‘Nuclear Weapons as Obstacles to International Security’, 
International Relations 16, no.3 (2002): 361-379, and Burke, ‘Nuclear Reason’. 
37 Rens van Munster and Casper Sylvest, ‘Reclaiming nuclear politics? Nuclear realism, the H-Bomb 
and globality’, Security Dialogue 45, no.6 (2014): 530-547; p.530; and, e.g. pp.535-536 and 543. 
38 Work in a broadly cultural anthropological vein, though beginning from a focus on nuclear weapons, 
arguably better situates that focus within wider social and nuclear technical infrastructures – for 
example, Hugh Gusterson, People of the Bomb: Portraits of America’s Nuclear Complex (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 204), especially pp.206-220; and Joseph P. Masco, The Nuclear 
Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2006). 
39 Lifton in Indefensible Weapons, p.61. 
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‘nutopia’ and the corresponding set of ideas labelled here as ‘nutopianism’ is 
suggested here to additionally capture specific features of visions for international 
nuclear order that retains the utopian intuitions of the ‘white cities’ line of thinking, 
but qualifies this with a concern with construction and use of nuclear weapons. 
Crucially, then, nutopianism is predicated upon the assumption that nuclear power has 
redeeming features that outweigh its destructive applications. Indeed ‘redemption’ has 
been and arguably remains central to the justification of projects for international 
nuclear order, and its religious overtones have not gone unnoticed.40 Walker, for 
example, muses that  ‘Perhaps not coincidentally for the United States, the main 
architect of this order, the idea of progressive overcoming was redolent of the 
Christian story of original sin (the nuclear weapon’s invention, Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki) precipitating the fall (the Cold War) followed by eventual redemption 
(through political transformation and the weapon’s elimination).’ ‘Whatever this 
story’s relevance’, he continues, as the Cold War unfolded and then after the USSR’s 
collapse, ‘the notion that the problem of nuclear weapons was capable of progressive 
limitation despite the anarchic nature of the international system gathered support.’41 
 
The ‘story’ of the redemption of nuclear power in the wake of the atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a potentially more significant facet of nuclear-order 
building than even Walker’s characterisation above might initially suggest. At the 
very least, as Walker’s rich and fine-grained analysis itself attests to, international 
nuclear order-building has been marked by the persistent accompaniment of 
identification of the ‘perpetual menace’ of nuclear weapons (Walker’s term) on the 
one hand with what might be termed as the ‘perpetual promise’ of nuclear power on 
the other.42 
 
Such overt tones of the religiosity of the theme of ‘redemption’ can be detected in, for 
example, President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s famous ‘Atoms for Peace’ address to the 
United Nations General Assembly in December 1953:  
 
Occasional pages of history do record the faces of the “great destroyers”, but the whole book of 
history reveals mankind’s never-ending quest for peace and mankind’s God-given capacity to 
build […] my country’s purpose is to help us move out of the dark chamber of horrors into the 
light, to find a way by which the minds of men, the hopes of men, the souls of men 
everywhere, can move forward towards peace and happiness as well-being […] salvation 
cannot be attained by one dramatic act’ but instead by […] many steps.43  
 
                                                        
40 The etymology of the word of course indicates the residues of its origins as of the act of being 
‘saved’, from error or sin, in a theological sense. 
41 Walker, A Perpetual Menace, p.6. 
42 As but one example, Walker notes the first report of the British Maud committee (1941) as a key 
point of ‘awakening’ to the potential military applications and unprecedented destructive capacity of 
nuclear power in weaponised form, the key initial point of ‘securitisation’ of nuclear power as an 
existential threat: ‘…the important point is that the production of plutonium for weapons and for civil 
purposes was mixed up from the start, a complication that would later both prompt and dog the 
development of international controls on the diffusion of nuclear technology’ – A Perpetual Menace, 
p.35 . 
43 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address the United Nations General Assembly, 8 December 1953, 
np. Available at https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech. Last accessed May 6 
2015. 
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But even long before then, and indeed even before the use of nuclear weapons on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the redemptive nutopian trope had been well established. 
Dedicated to the radiochemist Frederick Soddy (credited, along with Ernest 
Rutherford, with making path-breaking findings into the nature of radioactivity) and 
his ‘Interpretation of Radium’, H.G. Well’s The World Set Free arguably stands as the 
archetype of this kind of redemptive imagining of nuclear power.44 Not always 
considered among the best of Wells’ writings, The World Set Free is more often noted 
for its prescience in relation to the development of ‘atomic bombs’ in particular. 
Written in 1913 and published in 1914, the book imagines a world war (the ‘Last 
War’) in the 1950s in which whole cities are destroyed by such weapons, primed and 
dropped from aircraft: ‘…these atomic bombs which science burst on to the world 
that night were strange even to the men that used them’.45 But, as Weart notes, in the 
book ‘The near extinction of civilization taught the survivors a lesson, and they 
created a world government that nurtured a brilliant new society.’ Wells’ nutopia – 
which in the book is a form of world republic replete with atomic-powered flying cars 
and garden cities, where citizens ‘enjoying liberty and free love’ are governed by 
select members of a scientific elite – imagines a world in which nuclear power first 
destroys and then saves the world.46 As humanity comes to better understand the 
nature of atomic power and its potentialities, it revolutionises political structures 
accordingly, and ultimately redeems itself: ‘The catastrophe of the atomic bombs 
which shook men out of cities and businesses and economic relations shook them out 
of their old established habits of thought, and out of the lightly held beliefs and 
prejudices that came down to them from the past’.47  
 
The limits of Wells’ prescience were of course in the fact that he imagined there 
would be a world worth living in (and governing) in the wake of nuclear-armed 
conflict. Post-1945 nutopianism is predicated on the assumption that humanity cannot 
afford to ‘learn’ such a ‘lesson’ based on the actual experience of the use of nuclear 
weapons in war, and that the structures of international order needed to be radically 
adjusted accordingly.48 Similarly, the nutopianism of the nuclear age is not always so 
clearly marked by Wells’ certitude and specificity as to the multiple progressive 
applications of nuclear power: 
 
…the science, the technology, the industrial development involved in the so-called beneficial 
uses of atomic energy appear to be inextricably intertwined with those involved in making 
atomic weapons […] We have here a beginning but we don’t have any answers. We don’t have a 
tree with fruit ripe on, for us to shake the fruit down.49 
                                                        
44 H.G. Wells The World Set Free [ebook version] (2012) [1914]. Available from 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1059/1059-h/1059-h.htm. Last accessed May 6 2015.  
45 Wells, The World Set Free, Chapter the Second, ‘The Last War’, Section 4. 
46 Weart, Nuclear Fear, p.26. 
47 Wells, The World Set Free, Chapter the Fourth, ‘The New Phase’, Section 11. 
48 On this theme and for broader discussions of how the ‘nuclear revolution’ – more specifically the 
advent of thermonuclear weapons – led ‘nuclear realists’ such as Günder Anders, John Herz and Lewis 
Mumford to the assumption of incompatibility of nuclear weapons with existing institutions of 
international society, and to countenance radical transformation of global governance as a result, see 
van Munster and Sylvest, ‘Reclaiming nuclear politics?‘; cf. Campbell Craig, Glimmer of a New 
Leviathan (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2007).  
49 J. Robert Oppenheimer ‘Atomic Explosives’, 16 May 1946, in J. Robert Oppenheimer, The Open 
Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955) pp.5-7. 
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Considering the ‘problem’ of ‘“The International Control of Atomic Energy”’, a term 
he described as ‘…a sort of code…a code because the real problem is the prevention 
of war’, J. Robert Oppenheimer (the ‘father’ of the atomic bomb) held on to the 
prospects for ‘beneficial applications’. And though Oppenheimer as scientist could 
clearly argue that his reading of the prospects for ‘beneficial uses’ would be more 
than just guesswork, he aligned his own thinking with the ‘widespread belief’ that, 
given the right conditions, ‘good things’ would come from nuclear power if placed in 
‘the hands of intelligent and resourceful men’.50  
 
In relation to early attempts to construct an international nuclear order Oppenheimer’s 
nutopianism is particularly significant, not least as he was a key voice informing the 
Acheson-Lilienthal report of March 1946.51 In turn those views largely underpinned 
the ultimately unsuccessful Baruch Plan and its proposal for an international Atomic 
Development Authority that would provide international ownership of ‘dangerous’ 
nuclear activities.52 In spite of the failure of the Baruch Plan, the sentiment of 
Oppenheimer’s relatively sanguine reflections on the potential for peaceful 
applications of atomic energy arguably remains as the bedrock of both historical and 
contemporary efforts to govern an international nuclear order. Underpinning 
Eisenhower’s subsequent ‘Atoms for Peace’ ideal was the certain assertion that: 
 
It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the 
hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace. 
The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build up can be reversed, 
this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all 
mankind. […] That capability, already proved, is here – now – today. Who can doubt, if the 
entire body of the world's scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material 
with which to test and develop their ideas, that this capability would rapidly be transformed into 
universal, efficient, and economic usage?53 
 
The Atoms for Peace ideal, in Eisenhower’s framing at least, was not purely utopian 
in the common sense of that term. The ‘fearful trend’ of atomic military build-up was 
recognized by Eisenhower as a real and ongoing process rather than a remote 
dystopian nightmare; but so too were the ‘peaceful’ capacities of atom energy argued 
to be ‘no dream of the future’, they were ‘already proved’.54 
 
Making the world safe for the development of nuclear power? 
 
Cynics, of course, have argued that Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech was 
effectively a kind of rhetorical subterfuge to ‘distract’ the world audience away from 
                                                        
50 Ibid. 
51 Secretary of State’s Committee on Atomic Energy, 16 March 1946 Report on the International 
Control of Atomic Energy [The Acheson-Lilienthal Report] p.1. Available at 
http://www.learnworld.com/ZNW/LWText.Acheson-Lilienthal.html#page1. Last accessed May 6 
2015. 
52 Randy Rydell, ‘Looking Back: Going for Baruch: The Nuclear Plan that Refused to Go Away’, Arms 
Control Today, 1 June 2006. Available at   
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/LookingbackBaruch. Last accessed May 6 2015. 
53 Eisenhower, Address to the United Nations, 1953, np. 
54 Ibid. 
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the nuclearisation of NATO forces.55 Regarding the more recent ‘renaissance’ of 
‘[nuclear] disarmament politics’, in common with critics of the administration’s actual 
policies and progress Anne Harrington de Santana argued in 2011 that ‘While 
President Obama has placed a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons at the centre 
of his nuclear agenda, his administration has consistently prioritised agenda items that 
reduce nuclear danger through non-proliferation and arms control, rather than tackling 
the much tougher items that would form the basis for an effective practice of 
disarmament’.56 Moreover, continuing investment in the stewardship and 
development of the US nuclear weapons stockpile has for many commentators and 
campaigners signalled the extent to which the Obama administration preaches nuclear 
disarmament but practices nuclear weapons retention.57 The reflections of Sam Nunn 
- the former US senator and one of the ‘four horsemen’ argued to have initially 
influenced Obama - sum up the situation succinctly: ‘A lot of it is hard to explain. The 
president’s vision was a significant change in direction. But the process has preserved 
the status quo’.58 
 
As the actual progress and substantive degree of commitment to nuclear disarmament 
is called in to question, emphasis on the redeeming features of nuclear power become 
ever more important as a sustaining justification of political initiatives for 
international nuclear order. Mara Drogan’s assessment of Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for 
Peace’ argues that it was not intended to be a disarmament measure but rather aimed 
to ‘blunt nuclear fears’ and the expansion of the ‘American nuclear project’ 
domestically and internationally.59 Notably, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) continues to explicitly situate its mandate within, and as a continuation of, the 
original Atoms for Peace ideal as articulated by Eisenhower.60 Even if IAEA 
Secretary General Yukia Amano has stated that ‘The IAEA does not encourage 
countries to use nuclear power, nor do we try to discourage them. It is up to each 
sovereign state to make its own decision’61, the statute of the IAEA identifies its role 
                                                        
55 Martin J. Medhurst, ‘Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony: The Rhetorical Structure of a Cold 
War Campaign’, Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 4 (1997): 571-593. 
56 ‘The Strategy of Non-proliferation’, p.4; p.16. To substantiate the characterisation, Harrington de 
Santana contrasts the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit and the ‘New Start Treaty’ with Russia as prime 
examples of incremental progress on the control of nuclear materials and arms respectively with the 
relative paucity of progress or even emphasis on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and the 
Comprehensive Treaty. The latter, she argues, would be ‘agreements that would actually fundamentally 
change the relationship of states to the physical embodiment of nuclear weapons’ – p.16. 
57 See, variously: Steven Young, ‘Obama’s Trillion Dollar Nuclear Weapons Gamble’, 1 February 
2015. Available at http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/02/obamas-trillion-dollar-nuclear-weapons-
gamble/104217/ Last accessed 5 May 2015; Global Zero: A World Without Nuclear Weapons, no date, 
‘Obama’s Nuclear Weapons Spending Spree’, http://www.globalzero.org/obamas-nuclear-weapons-
spending-spree Last  accessed 5 May 2015. 
58 As quoted in William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, ‘US Ramping Up Major Renewal in Nuclear 
Arms’, The New York Times, 21 September 2014 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/us/us-ramping-
up-major-renewal-in-nuclear-arms.html Last accessed 5 May 2015. 
59 Mara Drogan, ‘Atoms for Peace, US foreign policy and the globalization of nuclear technology, 
1953-1960’ (PhD diss., State University of New York at Albany, 2011) 
http://gradworks.umi.com/34/87/3487479.html. Last accessed 05 May 2015. 
60 See, for example, Yukia Amano (2014) Secretary General of the IAEA, ‘The IAEA and Atoms for 
Peace in the 21st Century’, 9 April 2014. Available at 
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2014/amsp2014n08.html. Last accessed May 6 2015. 
61 Amano, ‘The IAEA and Atoms for Peace in the 21st Century’, np. 
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as being to ‘…accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, 
health and prosperity throughout the world [and to] ensure, so far as it is able, that 
assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not 
used in such a way as to further any military purpose’.62 Likewise the agency’s 
mission states that ‘ [the IAEA] assists its Member States, in the context of social and 
economic goals, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for various 
peaceful purposes, including the generation of electricity, and facilitates the transfer 
of such technology and knowledge in a sustainable manner to developing Member 
States’.63  
 
The latter formulations of the IAEA’s role suggest that rather than the potential 
ambivalence implied by Amano, the agency’s animating rationale remains making the 
world safe(r) for the development of nuclear power: by restraining the use of atomic 
energy for military ends and, simultaneously, preserving the space and scope for its 
development for peaceful purposes and benefits. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons maintains essentially the same central diptych as its animating 
rationale:  
 
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the 
consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to 
safeguard the security of peoples […]  
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, 
including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from 
the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all 
Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States.64  
 
Indeed, one way of reading the NPT is as an attempt to institutionalise Oppenheimer’s 
hope that peaceful uses and benefits of nuclear power could be used to incentivise a 
turn away from the temptation towards the construction and use of nuclear weapons - 
as a hallmark of this ‘grand enlightenment project’.65 In principle at least, the in-built 
inequality of the treaty’s division between nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear 
weapons states is offset not just by a commitment of all parties to the treaty to ‘pursue 
[nuclear disarmament] in good faith’ (Article VI) but also by the preservation and 
promise of scope for development of peaceful purposes of nuclear power. President 
Obama reiterated that logic in Prague in 2009 when he stated that: 
 
The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, 
countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful 
nuclear energy […] We must harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to 
combat climate change, and to advance peace opportunity [sic] for all people (Obama 2009: np). 
 
                                                        
62 IAEA, ‘The Statute of the IAEA’, 1956, np. Available at 
http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html#A1.1. Last accessed May 6 2015. 
63 IAEA, ‘The IAEA Mission Statement’, 2014, np. Available at 
http://www.iaea.org/About/mission.html. Last accessed May 6 2015. 
64 ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, p.1. Available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt.html. Last accessed May 6 2015. 
65 William Walker (2007) ‘Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment’, International Affairs 83 
no.3 (2012): 431-453; p.432. 
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Each of the above visions of the international nuclear order is underpinned by 
nutopianism as identified previously: imbued with a spirit of technological optimism, 
but at the same time qualified by an awareness of the destructive uses and 
potentialities of nuclear power. More than this, though, there is an innately 
redemptive tone within such visions of international nuclear order. This nutopianism 
is not so crass as to suggest that ‘peaceful benefits’ or potentialities of nuclear power 
can in some way simply atone for the devastation caused by the use of nuclear 
weapons in war. Notably, for example, Secretary General Amano’s remarks on the 
65th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki mentioned ‘civilian 
nuclear programmes’ only in passing, and even then only as part of a movement by 
the IAEA to ‘redouble efforts’ to ensure that nuclear materials from civilian 
programmes are not ‘diverted’ to nuclear weapons production, or ‘[fall] into the hands 
of terrorist groups’. And these, Amano states, are sub-elements of his ‘personal 
commitment to redouble efforts towards a world free of nuclear weapons’.66  Obama’s 
Prague Speech similarly places the ‘moral responsibility’ (emanating from Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki) on the elimination of nuclear weapons, in tandem with promotion of 
‘peaceful [nuclear] power’: ‘…as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have 
used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot 
succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it’.67 
 
Nuclearism reconsidered 
 
Given the assumptions of nutopianism, and in particular the assumption that a 
nuclear-weapons-free world does not, and indeed should not, be confused with the 
idea of an entirely nuclear-power-free world per se, it worth considering what an 
international nutopia might actually look like in more concrete terms. In this respect, 
Derek Abbott suggests that proponents of nuclear power (and those espousing 
nutopian visions necessarily are) should be subdivided further into ‘nuclear realists’ 
and ‘nuclear utopians’.68 ‘A nuclear realist suggests something on the order of 1 
terawatt of nuclear power as part of the global energy mix, providing security in terms 
of energy diversity and reduced carbon emission’69, whereas ‘A nuclear utopian’, by 
way of contrast in Abbot’s view, ‘goes much further and suggests that nuclear power 
can potentially supply the bulk of the world’s energy needs for many thousands of 
years to come and that perhaps a mix of renewables with nuclear power as the 
backbone supply is the long-term energy future’.70 Particularly in the context of ever-
increasing energy needs and a global climatic change, ‘If the utopian vision is a valid 
one’, Abbott argues, ‘then it provides considerable impetus to pull together and solve 
                                                        
66 Yukia Amano Secretary General of the IAEA, ‘Statement on Anniversary of the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki Bombings’, 6 August 2010, np. Available at 
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2010/amsp2010n014.html. Last accessed May 6 2015.   
67 ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Czech Republic’, 2009, np. 
68 Derek Abbott (2012), ‘Limits to Growth: Can nuclear power supply the world’s needs?’, Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists 68 no.5 (2012): 23-32. 
69 As an exemplar, Abbott cites Barry W. Brook, ‘Could nuclear fission energy, etc., solve the 
greenhouse problem? The affirmative case’, Energy Policy 42:?, (2012):4-8. 
70 Abbott, ‘Limits to Growth’, p.23. Abbott cites, as an exemplar of such ‘utopianism’, Wallace 
Manheimer, ‘Can fission and fusion breeding help civilization survive?’, Journal of Fusion Energy 25, 
nos.3-4 (2006): 121-139. 
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the various practical, safety, and economic problems that currently limit the rapid 
expansion of nuclear power’.71 
 
Yet Abbott’s assessment suggests caution about the prospects for ‘scaling up’ the 
current use of nuclear power. His ‘generous estimates’ put global power consumption 
at a figure of about 15 terawatts; meeting that consumption solely via nuclear power 
would, he argues, require scaling up from the current global figure of about 430 
commercial nuclear reactors worldwide to approximately 15,000 reactors. At such 
levels the pressures of scaling up to a ‘nuclear utopia’ would, Abbot contends, run 
into a series of practical limiting factors: of site selection (the availability of suitable 
sites would be limited, in terms of, for example, access to coolant water, and co-
locating reactor sites would increase the risk of common-mode failures); metal 
degradation in reactor vessels (the extent and rate of which may be difficult to 
determine with precision; the corresponding increase in production of nuclear waste); 
increased potential for accidents given the higher number of reactors in operation; and 
diminishing global supplies of uranium as well as other vital materials and elements 
required in the construction and operation of nuclear reactors.72  
 
To this list Abbott also factors in the concern that, even in spite of on-going efforts to 
create ‘proliferation resistant’ reactors and fuel cycles, ‘With a scale up to 15,000 
reactors worldwide, it would be nearly impossible to keep track of all fissile 
materials’, especially given that it ‘…is already challenging for today’s relatively 
small nuclear industry to provide assurance that materials have not been diverted for 
weapons’. Even with regard to nuclear fusion reactors (as opposed to fission, for 
which Abbott primarily identifies the limits above), Abbott remains highly sceptical 
both over the prospects for the technology and, more particularly its scalability. The 
risk of ‘diversion’ of materials into weapons production also remains as ‘deuterium 
used in heavy-water reactors and fusion reactors, at large volume, is cause for concern 
as it can be used to make lithium-6 deuteride thermonuclear warheads’.73 
 
As Abbott himself acknowledges, the scenarios envisaged above are based on the 
most ‘utopian’ variant of nuclear advocacy and a corresponding full scale ‘nuclear 
renaissance’. Abbott uses the hypothetical scenario, though, to raise questions that are 
pertinent even to more ‘realistic’ advocacy of the expansion of nuclear power.74 This 
suggests that the ‘peaceful purposes’ argument in relation to nutopian visions of 
international order, often framed in terms of the redeeming features of nuclear power, 
is less straightforward than nutopianism assumes and opens up space for 
corresponding reconsideration of ‘nuclearism’ and the scope of nuclear critique in 
international studies. The work of David Krieger is potentially distinctive in this 
regard. He too employs the concept of ‘nuclearism’, but in a way that conceives of 
critique of nuclear power in a more holistic sense than originally articulated by Lifton 
and Falk. ‘Nuclearism’, on Krieger’s understanding, ‘…is the belief that nuclear 
weapons and nuclear power are essential forms of progress that in the right hands will 
                                                        
71 ‘Limits to Growth’, p.24. 
72 Abbott, ‘Limits to Growth’, pp.24-28. 
73 ‘Limits to Growth’, p.26; p.28. 
74 Cf. Matthew Fuhrmann, How ‘Atoms for Peace’ Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2012). 
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protect peace and further the human condition’.75 In a more expansive concern with 
the ‘dangers’ of both nuclear weapons and ‘peaceful’ nuclear power, Krieger argues 
that ‘Believers in nuclearism, to the extent that they acknowledge these dangers, 
argue that nuclear technology brings benefits that more than compensate for its 
dangers’. Nuclearism, on this rendering, is dependent on maintaining an ‘artificial 
boundary between military and so-called peaceful uses of nuclear energy’. That 
artificiality, Krieger argues, can and should be challenged.76 And in terms of current 
visions of the international nuclear order (and visions of its future), the implications 
of this line of argument are challenging and far-reaching. The ‘inalienable right’ to 
‘peaceful’ nuclear power as embodied in the logic of the NPT and the purpose of the 
IAEA is, Krieger’s argument suggests, a constitutive part of the problem of 
international nuclear order, a ‘recipe for chaos’77 rather than an incentivising solution.  
 
Creation of international nuclear order, on this reading, is a much more fundamentally 
challenging problem if and when a strict distinction between 
peaceful/civil/constructive nuclear power and belligerent/military/destructive nuclear 
power is called into question. Indeed there is even evidence to suggest that 
discussions of ‘nuclearism’ by the term’s original authors have more recently evolved 
in this direction towards consideration of a more inclusive focus on the interfaces 
between ‘civil’ and ‘military’ nuclear power. This specific point has been raised more 
recently in Richard Falk’s remarks (in dialogue with Krieger):  
 
I suppose […] in terms of both avoiding disastrous Fukushima-like events and facilitating 
acquisition of the weaponry […] The question we need to address is whether the quest for 
nuclear disarmament is properly separated from issues bearing on the viability and desirability 
of nuclear energy or whether nuclear disarmament cannot go forward unless the pursuit of 
nuclear energy is also renounced.78  
 
Most fundamentally, the potential for both production and use of enriched Uranium 
(U-235) in and by ‘civil’ nuclear infrastructures, or Plutonium 239 (Pu-239) as a by-
product of fissioning of uranium, are constitutive of the problems that the current 
international nuclear order both sustains and seeks to contain. Krieger, building from 
Falk’s reflections on ‘The question we need to address…’ above, articulates a 
response that constitutes, effectively, an imminent critique of the contemporary 
international nuclear order: ‘It is highly ironic that the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
describes peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which would include power generation, as 
an “inalienable right.” This means that in a very real way, the treaty works against one 
of its principal objectives, that is, preventing nuclear weapons proliferation’. 
Engaging a critique of the nutopian underpinnings of the NPT Krieger notes that he 
‘[has] always thought that the NPT lacked appropriate caution in its characterization 
                                                        
75  David Krieger, ‘Nuclearism and its Insecurities’ in Majid Tehranian (ed.) Worlds Apart: Human 
Security and Global Governance (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999) pp.109-124, p.109. 
76 Krieger, ‘Nuclearism and its Insecurities’, p.114. 
77 Alice Slater, ‘The inalienable right to peaceful nuclear power: A recipe for chaos’ in Richard Falk 
and David Krieger (eds.) At the Nuclear Precipice: Catastrophe or Transformation (London: Palgrave, 
2008), pp.57-66. 
78 Falk in Richard Falk and David Krieger, The Path to Zero: Dialogues on Nuclear Dangers (Boulder, 
CO: Paradigm, 2012) p.103. 
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and encouragement of nuclear energy programmes’.79 He even goes so far as to 
endorse the contention that the most effective (even though he characterises it as 
‘unlikely’) constraint on proliferation risks would be a complete ‘phase-out’ of 
civilian nuclear energy.   
 
Krieger’s re-definition of the scope and of ‘nuclearism’, and of critique of it, stands as 
an invitation to characterise the ‘insecurities’ and ‘dangers’ of the nuclear age in 
much more expansive terms. Indeed Krieger at times seems to rule out the very 
possibility of clear distinction or dividing line between ‘civil’ and ‘military’ nuclear 
power. Instead, his framing of the insecurities of the ‘nuclear age’ imagines a 
spectrum of nuclear dangers that inherently overlap with and bleed into one another. 
Thus, as he puts it, one of the ‘great challenges of our time’ is to ‘eliminate 
technologies that put the future of humanity at risk of annihilation or create an 
enduring legacy of poisonous materials that cannot be adequately contained and 
prevented from causing harm to countless future generations’.80  
 
And yet, the direct (from Falk) and indirect (from Lifton) reflections from the 
originators of the term and debate on nuclearism suggests a degree of reticence on 
their part as to this potentially more expansive form of nuclear critique. Falk at times 
seems highly sympathetic to Krieger’s arguments: ‘Nuclear weaponry is genocidal in 
its tendency, if not omnicidal and ecocidal, while nuclear power is a hubristic toss of 
the dice that could at some future times release lethal radiation in massive doses 
severely harmful to health and societal security’.81 Elsewhere, though, he wonders: 
 
…If the proliferation risks arising from nuclear reactors could be minimized, should the 
objections of those of us advocating nuclear disarmament and demilitarization be dropped? In 
a central sense, this question asks whether under some, but not all, circumstances, nuclear 
disarmament is separable from the debate on the future of nuclear energy. And finally, 
supposing that nuclear power development continues as before Fukushima, does it modify 
our thinking about nuclear disarmament and, more generally, military uses of nuclear 
weapons? If so, in what ways?82 
 
In the above, Falk in effect poses a series of questions to the more expansive form of 
nuclear critique advocated by Krieger and in the latter’s redefinition of nuclearism. 
Though he is sympathetic, Falk’s line of questioning suggests uncertainty about the 
latter approach. Notably, it is predicated on a lingering hope that ‘If the proliferation 
risks arising from nuclear reactors could be minimized…’; in other words, Falk 
suggests the residual prospect that both technological and political means can be 
found to create and shore up (both literally and figuratively) a division between 
nuclear power for energy generation on the one hand and nuclear power for weaponry 
on the other.  
 
 
 
                                                        
79 Krieger, in Falk and Krieger, Dialogues on Nuclear Dangers, p.104. 
80 Krieger, in Falk and Krieger, Dialogues on Nuclear Dangers, p.119. 
81 Falk, in Falk and Krieger, Dialogues on Nuclear Dangers, p.120. 
82 Falk, in Falk and Krieger, Dialogues on Nuclear Dangers, p.111. 
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Conclusion 
 
Robert Jay Lifton, for his part, has also expressed a concern that a more expansive 
and holistic form of nuclear critique along the lines suggested by Krieger might lead 
to facile equivalence of ‘Fukushima and Hiroshima’. No-one should be left in any 
doubt, Lifton asserts, that even in the wake of Fukushima ‘it is nuclear weapons that 
most endanger mankind’. But he goes on to argue that:  
 
…pro-nuclear power forces could prevail only by managing to instill [sic] in the minds of 
Japanese people a dichotomy between the physics of nuclear power and that of nuclear 
weapons, an illusory distinction made not only in Japan but throughout the world […] There is 
also the hope (and here the sameness of the technology is recognized) that something peaceful 
can be derived from the awesome, world-destroying nuclear deity; that we humans who 
commissioned and built the weapons can somehow find redemption in that same ultimate 
technology.
 83 
 
Noting how Lifton’s reflections return us to the theme of ‘redemption’, critical 
international studies might do well to reflect on the role that redemptive hopes and 
nutopian understandings of nuclear power continue to play in contemporary 
programmes for (and reform of) international nuclear order. As illustrated above, such 
programmes are often crucially predicated on a common sense distinction between 
‘peaceful’ (or civil energy generation) and ‘military’ (weapons) forms of nuclear 
power. However debates over whether the ‘peaceful atom’ is as straightforwardly 
benign as many proposals for international order assume lead to a question as to 
whether the scope of nuclear critique within international studies should be 
correspondingly expanded.  
 
More recent debates on ‘nuclearism’ consider the potential for more expansive 
understandings of nuclearism to open to the scope out beyond nuclear weapons (as 
object of critique) and disarmament (as a normative and political goal). But they also 
provisionally point to a degree of reticence and uncertainty as to whether a more 
expansive critique of nuclearism might risk diluting the force of a more discrete 
concern with disarmament and critique of nuclear weapons. The evolution of debates 
on nuclearism suggest a complex process of navigation between critique of hard and 
fast distinctions between ‘civil’ an ‘military’ nuclear power on the one hand, and 
flattening of distinctions between different types of nuclear dangers on the other hand. 
Doing so undoubtedly opens up a series of complex questions: thinking about nuclear 
insecurities as an interconnected spectrum that captures issues usually subdivided into 
‘peaceful’ and ‘military’ purposes is much more challenging than treating nuclear 
weapons as the sole problem to be solved. But critical reflection on the common sense 
nutopian underpinnings of proposals for international nuclear order might at the very 
least provide a better starting point from which to appraise the multifaceted 
insecurities of the nuclear age.  
 
 
                                                        
83 Lifton, ‘Fukushima and Hiroshima’, np. 
 
